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1. Introduction 
Europe, with its focus on institution-building, continues to maintain mental reservations 
about intra-regional cooperation in what Eurocentrics have long labelled – often in ignorance 
– the ‘Far East’, although economic integration is actually already practised there to a high 
degree. The East has even managed to find the energy needed to overcome, rather than to 
aggravate, their territorial disputes, while their Confucian culture’s distinction between 
private and public realms remains less relevant than it is in Western minds. 
Indeed, East Asian economic integration is less well known in Europe than is desirable in the 
EU’s own enlightened self-interest. It is also badly understood, not least because a range of 
‘soft’ cultural, historical and political aspects are insufficiently appreciated in Europe. The 
present CEPS Essay offers a deeper personal reflection on the emergence and development 
of East Asian economic cooperation and market-driven integration. It attempts to address 
some of the lingering reservations on both sides and render the reservations in East Asia 
more intelligible to Europeans.  
The paper first sets out the basic reservations harboured in Europe and East Asia towards 
one another. Second, the notion of ‘cross-border’ trade cooperation and regional trade 
agreements is carefully (re)considered and shown to be culturally and historically (hence, 
also legally) distinct in East Asia from Europe. Third, a brief section on monetary 
cooperation is presented, basically a regional response to the IMF’s failure to help in the 1997 
Asian financial crises. Fourth, more recent energy (and related environmental) cooperation is 
reviewed, also in the light of potentially serious territorial conflicts accentuated by tensions 
over access to resources. Section 5 offers conclusions.  
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2. Western reservations about Asia 
In earlier times, Europe worked to discourage economic exchanges within Asia1 by dividing 
up the continent and its islands into separate colonies with long-lasting border lines. 
Max Weber prematurely concluded in 1905 that capitalism could not work with 
Confucianism. After two world wars, the cold war did not stimulate movements towards 
cooperation in Asia either, very much in contrast to initiatives in Brussels and Warsaw at the 
time. Rather, Europeans saw what Gunner Myrdal called an “Asian drama”2 being played 
out in the Far East, and it took us another quarter of a century to wake up to the realities of 
the “Asian miracle’” as diagnosed by the World Bank in 1993. But many in the West found 
their continued scepticism subsequently confirmed in the Asian financial crises of 1997. 
These events rocked the region from Jakarta to Seoul and provoked calls for stricter 
regulation in those markets. Partly with the help of the IMF, the ‘flying geese’ of East Asia 
took to the air again, but this time increasingly led by the ‘benign dragon’ of China. Beijing’s 
top-down technocracy also seems to be steering more successfully through the global crises 
since 2008. By increasingly decoupling the world’s second-biggest national economy from 
the troubles in the West, China’s ‘peaceful rise’ gets closer again to fulfilling its own name as 
the “Middle Country” in Asia, ‘nomen est omen’.3 
Not yet, you might interject; we have plenty of reservations yet to examine!  
3. Asian reservations 
First of all, there are the more than $3 trillion of China’s foreign reserves. As these are mostly 
in floating Western currencies, they are therefore not independent from the fluctuations of 
the unruly global financial market, let alone the current economic crisis in the eurozone. 
Second, even depressed Japan – not to mention dynamic South Korea – maintains its mental 
reservations and is not yet willing to submit to Chinese regional leadership. The autocratic 
‘Beijing model’ is not (yet) a consensus. Its state-led ‘market-socialism’ may exert some 
impact in ASEAN countries (but now less in Myanmar since people’s protest there brought 
not only a Chinese dam project to a halt) and Africa4 (an odd and fast-growing one million 
Chinese already working there), beating the competition of idealistic and conditionality-
bound Europe. Many East Asians consider that China has drawn the right lessons from 
Meiji-Japan in opening up to the outside world and doing so pragmatically with 12-year 
plans joining the global game. Similarly, post-war Korea successfully moved in smaller steps 
of respectively five years towards industrialisation, followed by a gradual opening up as 
well.  
                                                     
1 Beyond the euro-centric acceptance of Asia as being “everything east of Europe”, authors now 
increasingly recognise the Asia-Europe Meeting’s (ASEM) membership as the defining criterion of 
belonging to either Asia or Europe – see Dinh Thi Hien Luong, “Regional Powers and the Building of 
an East Asian Community”, paper presented at the Asia-Pacific Conference, Keio University, Tokyo, 8 
December 2005, p. 2 (http://eusa-japan.org/download/eusa_ap/paper_DinhThiHienLuong.pdf). 
2 See Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, 20th Century Fund, 1968. 
3 China has regained its middle position not only in Asia, but according to the IMF, it is now the most 
“central” trading power in the whole world, based on its extensive links to other economies; see 
“Sino-dependency”, The Economist, 25 August 2012.  
4 The BBC reported on 18 July 2012 that China is setting aside $20 billion for Africa, but its reporter 
commented that “democracy and governance should remain up to the Africans, while the money can 
come from China”. 
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Third, most Asians seem to harbour reservations against deepening integration, in particular 
regarding the institutionalised version as practised without historical precedent by the EU. 
The Asians claim their region is too diverse and varied.5 They point out that the whole 
gamut of major world religions originates on their home ground; that you not only have 
some of the largest countries there like China and India, but in between also some of the 
smallest like Bhutan and Brunei. Asia encompasses the world’s richest country, namely 
Japan,6 and just nearby one of the poorest, i.e. North Korea. The latter also features as the 
most closed market,7 in opposition to Hong Kong, which is often regarded as the most open 
economy. You find in Asia with India the ‘largest democracy’ neighbouring the small and 
almost absolute monarchy of Bhutan, focused on GDH.8 Asians likewise emphasise the 
maritime dispersion of spoken languages over thousands of traditionally unconnected 
islands. 
4. Trans-border realities in East Asia 
But by stressing these differences as hindering cooperation, they not only run counter to the 
basic principles of complementarity and magnetic attraction of opposite poles as well as their 
own understanding of Yin and Yang. They also overlook their very successful 
implementation of Ricardo’s principle of trade between divergent economies.9 What for him 
was the comparative advantage of the exchange of UK textiles for Portuguese wines is now 
often the specialisation and economies of scale of the computer chips of one country fitting 
into the mother-board of another in value adding chains of production for export to third 
markets. With limited liberalisation in East Asia, such trade only slowly moves from the 
Ricardian model of favouring exporters and reciprocity, to the Schumpeterian one, where 
opening up to imports serves as a tool to increase competitiveness at home through the 
incentives it provides for the domestic industries to innovate and restructure. Under 
Schumpeter’s verdict, the argument dominates that, if opening to the outside does not kill 
import-competing sectors, they only get stronger. 10 
While in Western cultures the understanding of the central term in market economics of 
‘competition’ or ‘concurrence’ inherently emphasises the ‘togetherness’ (com-/con-) of such 
                                                     
5 See for instance Sung-Hoon Park, “East Asian Economic Integration and the Strategy of the EU”, 
Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2003, p. 11; Dinh, op. cit., p. 9, also points out the 
diversity and widening gaps in approaches toward an East Asian Community.  
6 According to The Economist of 3 July 2012, Japan in 2008 even beat the United States because of its 
higher physical and human “wealth per person”. The average Japanese had more human capital than 
anyone else in the world. 
7 Although the generational change to Kim Jong-un might bring some relief, the closed market of 
North Korea will hardly break open suddenly, see Financial Times, “Beijing hints at reforms in North 
Korea”, 15 August 2012. 
8 Grand Domestic Happiness. 
9 Junko Suzuki and Nobuhiro Kinoshita (“Feasibility of an East Asian FTA and Common Agricultural 
Policy”, Kyushu University, Symposium, 1 February 2007, p. 18) ignore this basic principle of trade 
when they headline a chapter “Huge economic gaps hinder FTAs”. They admit the huge price 
differences for instance for milk, in Japan costing 86 yen, in Korea 60 yen and in China only 20 yen. 
However, they do not blame the vested interests of the influential farm lobbies for the otherwise 
supported trilateral FTA, but rather want to perpetuate the protection against free trade with funds 
from a ‘Common Agricultural Policy’ of old that the EU has put to the past.  
10 B. Kerremans and J. Adriaensen, “Ricardian or Schumpeterian Trade Policies? The European Union 
and its Motives for Engaging in Trade Liberalisation”, in M. Dumont and G. Rayp (eds), International 
Business not as Usual, Ch. 6, Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Garant, 2011, pp. 95-115. 
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efforts, the more collective thinking in the East originally translated this term into much 
more of a negative rivalry of opposing forces.11 In order to overcome these rivalries,12 
agreements have to be found with the other side rather than unilateral liberalisation.  
Hence, after some reluctance, South Korea joined the bandwagon of East Asian bilaterals 
under the pressure of its big business of ‘chaebol’ rather than pursue the difficult potential 
‘omnibus’13  of the WTO. As in other fields, at first following Japan and then speedily 
overtaking it, the peninsula started implementing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) recently 
with the biggest markets in the world, the EU and the US, which still remain mere visions for 
its island neighbour. However, Japan and South Korea together with China started first 
negotiations of a trilateral agreement on trade and investment with handshakes on 26 March 
2013 in Seoul that would cover 20% of the global GDP14 and could form the basis for an East 
Asia Community. A Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in Seoul already serves as its inner 
soul.15 
The leaders of China, Japan and Korea pronounce their respective names completely 
differently, much more at variance than accents may impact between Merkel, Hollande and 
di Rupo. However, in East Asia the leaders have a literally meaningful Sino-script basically 
in common for understanding most of its written content. Their ideological facades might 
look contrasting in Communist red and capitalist blue or even still the greenback’s colour, if 
not simply black and white. But political appearances can be deceptive and personal 
meetings in Asia lead to more than ping-pong, as we have seen also with Nixon’s encounter 
with Mao. Nowadays, peninsular Korea as an international hub in between the continent 
and the island nations might be likened to Belgium’s position in the EU in various aspects. 
Might we see a Korean Van Rompuy emerge from the Land of the Morning Calm to reassure 
its neighbours and hammer out compromises on red-hot energy-filled issues between the 
two alleged contenders for hegemony?  
But East Asia is not Europe, and our histories and cultures are clearly different. Often 
enough in the past, there have been struggles for hegemony in the region between China and 
Japan.16 Although much of Japan’s learning and culture has come from the continent over 
millennia and China has seen the opening of Meiji Japan as a model for its own ouverture to 
the world, both countries have recently hardly enjoyed a mutual relationship free of tension. 
                                                     
11 The word for competition 競争 (pronounced kyousou in Japanese) in Chinese script includes the 
character of rivalry; for details see Wolfgang Pape, “Socio-Cultural Differences and International 
Competition Law”, European Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4, December 1999, pp. 438-460, in particular pp. 
448-451. 
12 Professor Shujiro Urata of Waseda University and Stanford University (announced as “one of the 
most distinguished Japanese experts on trade issues”), also spoke of “rivalry” between Japan and 
China as well as Japan and Korea in his presentation on “The Growth of FTAs in East Asia”, 9 July 
2012 at a meeting organised by the Madariaga Foundation in Brussels. 
13 In its literal Latin meaning of ‘for and by all’, cf. definition of ‘omnilateralism’ by the author in 
Wikipedia; further details on his blog (http://omnilateralism.blogspot.be/). 
14 As reported by NHK World Services Radio (in Japanese) on 26 March 2013 in the evening Tokyo 
time. 
15 See details on its website (http://www.tcs-asia.org). 
16 See Christopher M. Dent, East Asian Regionalism, Milton Park, 2008, pp. 172-176, Case Study 5.2 
“Japan and China – hegemonic rivals or regional co-leadership?”. However, Dinh, op. cit., p. 1 and 
passim, calls them only “regional powers” in competition but implies in her study that they are the 
only ones in the East Asian region. Yinan He (in Alternatives Internationales No. 57, December 2012, “Le 
marché peut prévenir la guerre mais pas la haine”, p. 38) reminds us Europeans of “les relations 
relativement pacifiques qu’entretenaient les deux pays dans leurs histoire antérieure”. 
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While Western colonialists threatened China into opening the country’s ports, Japanese 
troops invaded other parts of the Middle Kingdom. At the same time as the Chinese 
Communists were internally fighting and finally expelling their nationalist rivals, China 
faced the threat of a deeper invasion by the Japanese. Nippon’s colonial rule over Manchuria 
and the practices by its military during WWII are engrained in the memory of old and new 
generations of Chinese. Schools and many of the media manage to maintain them in the 
Chinese mind. The Communist leaders have hardly ever publicly acknowledged Japan’s 
official aid since WWII, which the island country wants to see as reparations for – albeit not 
always clearly acknowledged – past misdeeds. In public, China frequently plays the history 
card of Japanese war crimes, unfortunately made worse by occasional visits of Japanese 
nationalist leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine worshipping Nippon’s militarism. Even NGOs 
and academics of both countries cannot yet agree with each other how to objectively compile 
the historical facts of the massacre by the Japanese in Nanjing in 1937. Ongoing territorial 
disputes, such as over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, perpetuate bilateral tensions with China 
as well as Taiwan17 and pop up every once in a while with nationalists on all sides18 
symbolically pouring oil onto the heated debate. Painfully, it is precisely oil that is amongst 
other resources expected to be found in big bubbles under the bottom of the territory in 
contention.  
Likewise, with the Koreans, Japan could not yet settle issues over an islet near the 
peninsula’s coast surrounded by rich fishing grounds and natural gas deposits19 (and over 
the Kurils with Russia for that matter). Occasionally, this keeps disturbing Japan’s relations 
with its neighbours until this very day. Of course, emotions dominate the scene over the 
rocks of Dokdo/Takeshima when politicians are visiting.20 Especially emotional are the scars 
from memories of Korean ‘comfort women’ that were forced to work as sex slaves by 
Japanese soldiers and still fight for compensation. Feelings of loss of face and the Asian 
culture of shame (rather than guilt that can be paid off) do not facilitate the solution of these 
problems either.  
Notwithstanding our more transparent culture of guilt, post-WWII Germany and France still 
faced some difficulties to settle territorial issues over Saarland, as did Germany with Poland 
when resolving the problems of the long-disputed Oder-Neisse Line. 21  Only in 2003 a 
                                                     
17  This is particularly delicate for Japan, because on this issue common to China and Taiwan 
(respectively dealt with mainly by Japan’s Foreign Ministry or METI) it cannot follow Nippon’s 
traditional policy of divide et impera based on experience in its own group-oriented culture. Rather, 
Japan confronts both sides of the Taiwan Strait as if they were almost in the same boat. (For Japan’s 
policy of ‘divide and rule’, see e.g. its attempt to divide France from the European Commission on the 
problem of imports of tape-recorders in the early 1980s as well as more recently its approach to 
negotiating FTAs with ASEAN individually with its member countries, instead of dealing with the 
Association as one group, as done by China and Korea.)  
18 Dinh, op. cit., p. 8, mentions rising nationalism in the region as an important challenge to building 
an East Asian Community. From her Vietnamese viewpoint, she criticises Japan for “not being sincere 
with its wrongdoing in the past” and China for its “irredentist claims to disputed territories”.  
19 See International Herald Tribune, 11 August 2012. 
20  See “Wenn Emotionen dominieren –Japan und Südkorea reden mehr übereinander als 
miteinander”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 August 2012. 
21 The solutions to these border issues in Europe came through self-determination and international 
treaties and not through any ‘superstructure’, for which Prof. Hitoshi Tanaka envies Europe in order 
to resolve conflicts in East Asia; see his presentation on “East Asia – Conflict or Cooperation” at the 
EU-Asia Centre, Brussels, 11 September 2012. However, the resolution of the ‘Irish conflict’ with the 
help of the EU might better serve as a learning object for East Asian border disputes through “the 
notion that economic cooperation may lead to political cooperation” (see Trevor Salmon, “The EU’s 
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common Franco-German history school book for use in both countries has been compiled for 
the first time in order to promote a “shared vision” of history, which so far – as anywhere 
else in the world – had been left to subjective interpretations as national histories.22 This is 
notably the case amongst China, Japan and Korea, although there are continuing efforts 
made amongst East Asian scholars and NGOs, even occasionally including officials from 
national ministries, to establish common denominators for the study of history23 and to find 
agreement on the description of certain controversial events of their past.  
Nationalism is mounting worldwide not only because of economic crises, and the recent 
(s)election of new leaders in the three countries only confirms this trend. A decade ago in 
East Asia, a certain form of nationalism found expression in bestselling books of ‘no-
saying’,24 but now it increasingly takes more vociferous forms on the Internet where web-
fora can hardly be restrained by authorities, and notably young people let off chauvinistic 
steam.  
In the wider geopolitical context, Japan’s and South Korea’s alliances with the US and most 
recently their declared intention to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with America is 
seen by many as aimed against China in order to contain the latter’s rise as an economic and 
political power. However, invariably, new agreements quickly trigger jealousies by rivals 
who then want to enter into similar negotiations (see e.g. Japan pushing for an FTA with the 
EU as it feels left behind by the ‘KorEU’ FTA). Thus, because China can only watch the TPP 
from afar, it seems more inclined to join Japan and Korea in a trilateral FTA that is now being 
negotiated in earnest. Also here, high custom tariffs are less of a problem, as all three 
countries have already brought them down to an average of less than 10% for the bulk of 
their manufactures. A particularly controversial issue would be to open up their trade in 
agricultural produce, which in the region enjoys a protection equivalent (up) to several 
hundred percent in tariffs in the case of rice, playing to the tune of disproportionally 
influential farmers’ lobbies. Depending on how comprehensive and deep such a trilateral 
agreement would become, the question of how it would deal with non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 
would form an interesting case study for distant trade partners of East Asia like the EU and 
the US. Namely, cum grano salis, NTBs in their wider definition25 – including basic socio-
                                                                                                                                                                     
Role in Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Northern Ireland”, European Foreign Affairs Review 7, 2002, p. 
339). 
22 In order to overcome such nationalist distortions of European history notably for future generations, 
the project originated from the 2003 “Franco-German Youth Parliament”, which brought together 
some 500 youngsters from French and German upper secondary schools. Published with the title 
“Histoire/Geschichte” since 2006, more than 100,000 copies of the book have been bought. Due to this 
‘success history’, not only has Germany considered a similar project bilaterally in cooperation with the 
Czech Republic and also with Poland, but likewise the Slovak Republic and Hungary are discussing 
the possibility of publishing a common history school book. For further details, see Wolfgang Pape, 
“Oshu ni okeru furansu to doitsu no kankei” [German-French Relations within Europe], in Noriko 
Yasue (ed.), EU to furansu [EU and France], Kyoto: Horitsu Bunka Sha, 2012, pp. 171-191. 
23 The content of history books raises not only issues with Japan, but also with others, for instance 
with China; see “Dispute over teaching Chinese history shakes Hong Kong”, IHT, 4 September 2012. 
24 It started in 1991 with the book by Akio Morita and Shintaro Ishihara, The Japan That Can Say No, 
was then followed up in 1995 by an anti-West publication by Ishihara with former Prime Minister 
Mohamed Mahathir of Malaysia under the title The Voice of Asia and in 1996 echoed by a group of 
Chinese nationalists in their book China Can Say No and its later version called China Can Still Say No. 
25 According to the OECD glossary, the term non-tariff barriers refers to all barriers to trade that are 
not tariffs. However, in the history of GATT/WTO, further distinctions are made from non-tariff 
measures (NTMs), which are “complex, highly country-specific, and constantly changing” (Roy 
Santana and Lee Ann Jackson, “Identifying non-tariff barriers: Evolution of multilateral instruments 
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cultural patterns if not even difficult languages26 – (excluding arbitrarily erected barriers as 
such) can be said to be “naturally the bigger a burden the wider the cultural gap” between 
the trade partners involved. With Lipset’s observations of America’s ‘exceptionalism’ and 
Japan’s ‘uniqueness’ being at opposite ends of the scale in cultural terms,27 their risks of 
perceiving NTBs behind each other’s borders must also be the highest. Argumentum e 
contrario, China, Korea and Japan being neighbours, have enjoyed millennia of shared 
cultural flows28 with their predisposition towards harmony29 in groups introducing rice 
cultivation, chopsticks, Sino-script, Confucianism and Buddhism, etc. In contrast, Western 
influence was kept out of Japan during most of Nippon’s isolationist period of sakoku.30 Also 
China and Korea have similarly resisted too much Western influence. Such culturally 
assimilated countries should find fewer NTBs amongst their trinity than the West with them. 
As a simple example: just as food labels of ingredients with Latin-derived terms create less of 
a problem for many educated Europeans, for most Chinese, Japanese and Koreans this is the 
case with labels written in Sino-script, although their pronunciations of it might be 
completely different. Likewise, cultural affinity clearly helps to naturally find more 
commonality in industrial product standards, etc. For example, a Japanese professor would 
not dare to lose face by trying to justify a divergent standard for skis because of a ‘difference 
in the snow’ that falls – possibly still from the same cloud – just less than a hundred 
kilometres away on the other side of the Korean Strait. However, an academic in Tokyo 
pretended just such a difference of falling crystallised water in the mid-1980s in order to 
prevent imports of skis from far away Europe in Japan.  
Naturally, greater mutual familiarity and cultural as well as geographical proximity has 
tended to facilitate trade amongst these economies in the Far East. Nevertheless, even 
Japanese insiders still regard their country as a ‘closed economy’.31 Korea with a similar 
homogeneity and still rather mercantilist policies is not very different in this regard. Nor is 
China that has only started to open up in the 1980s – albeit slowly – and only now 
increasingly appreciates imports from Europe and its neighbours (especially if they include 
much sought after know-how), notably since joining the WTO in 2002. All three countries 
have hardly advanced their trade model from protective Ricardian to domestic competition 
stimulating Schumpeterian. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and evidence from the disputes (1948-2011)”, World Trade Review, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2012, p. 462. 
Notwithstanding, WTO Agreements do not define the term NTB, but the GATT preamble speaks of 
“tariffs and other barriers”.  
26 With the basic need for communication in any trade, studies using a ‘common language dummy 
variable’ estimate the importance of speaking different languages to be equivalent to a tax of about 
7%, while policy barriers such as tariffs and NTBs amount to 8% (see Kyounghee Lee, “International 
Trade in Services and the Role of English”, Journal of East Asian Economic Integration, Vol. 16, No. 3, 
September 2012, p. 291.  
27 Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism, 1996, NY, NY: W.W. Norton & Co, pp. 211-263, 
notably his table on p. 224. 
28 See Wolfgang Pape, Models of Integration in Asia and Europe, Luxembourg, 2001, p. 13; also available 
as PDF via website (bookshop.europa.eu/.../ViewPDFFile-OpenPDFFile). 
29 Jin Wenxue, a trilingual bestseller author in Japan, describes ‘harmony’ (和 wa) as an essentially 
common feature in East Asia; see 金文学 Jin Wenxue, 日中韓 NitChuuKan (Japan-China-Korea), 
Tokyo: Shodensha, 2012, p. 23. 
30 Sakoku (鎖国) literally meaning ‘chained country’ through the exclusion of foreigners. It refers to 
the Decree of Isolation of 1535 by its ruler of the time that secluded Japan notably from Europeans, 
their goods and ideas until 1858. 
31 See presentation by Prof. Shujiro Urata, op. cit. 
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However, in spite of this vast economic growth potential from further liberalisation with 
more competition, these neighbours already generate an astoundingly high and rising level 
of intra-regional trade amongst themselves.32 The second and the third largest national 
economies are highly intertwined, with China now being Japan’s most important trading 
partner. Both agreed recently on the introduction of direct exchange of their currencies Yuan 
and Yen to avoid the costly detours via the dollar. In 2012, they also started to mutually buy 
their government bonds. The market-driven integration by growth in trade and FDI33 is 
particularly strong for parts and components in the sectors of machinery and information 
technologies. Fragmentation strategies have led multinational companies to break up their 
manufacture and spread it in tight networks over borders seeking the most efficient locations 
with low labour and transport costs to build ever-more successful lines of value-adding 
productions. Hence, unlike the more political, vision-driven and legalistic institution-based 
integration by earlier enlightened elites in Europe, successful economic players in East Asia 
pragmatically spread multitudes of nets of productive links across their borders motivated 
by little more than the promise of positive results on the world markets. True, nowadays 
visionary political leaders are lacking in Europe, too. Surely, the East Asians have not 
selected their new governmental triumvirate of engineers in Beijing and the family-famed 
politicians in Seoul and in Tokyo for their intellectual creativity and vision of the region. 
However, continuing institution-building for stronger governance has fundamentally 
anchored integration in Europe, surviving and even strengthening in economic crises and 
political quakes. And yes, the trilateral of China, Japan and Korea has set up a small 
secretariat in Seoul in 2011, but its role as a stabilising institution is still very limited indeed.  
A key issue, of course, lies in the understanding of the concept of sovereignty. Centuries of 
wars and subsequent border changes (exemplified by the vacillating history of Alsace) have 
already diluted lines of territorial sovereignty in Europe. Later flows of migration of ‘natives’ 
of one place to other ‘nations’ have fortunately further weakened national identities in 
Europe. Continuous communication and exchanges have made it natural that the highest 
levels of our traditional hierarchies, our monarchs, have been coming the closest together 
internationally, namely in numerous transnational royal marriages. Such an idea remains 
unimaginable, for instance, for the protective Imperial Household Agency of Japan, still 
shrouded in protective taboos. Nor can foreign-born citizens climb the ladders of public 
office as easily in these Asian countries as some did recently for instance in France and 
                                                     
32 While it amounted to just 25% in the early 1960s in East Asia (Christopher M. Dent, East Asian 
Regionalism, Milton Park: Routledge, 2008, p. 43), the Asian Development Bank now reports amongst 
its 48 member countries an intra-regional share of trade growing from 56.2% in 2008 to 59.3% in 2010; 
see website of ADB (http://aric.adb.org/index.php).  
Among the three countries of Northeast Asia, China, Japan and Korea, with a prospect of a ‘CJK FTA’ 
intra-regional trade has grown rather rapidly during the past 20 years from 12.3% in 1990 to 24.1% in 
2004, but after a decrease in the Asian financial crisis reached 22.5% in 2010. CJK traded mostly 
intermediate goods in their triangle, their share representing 61.1% in 2009. However, especially 
noteworthy are the soaring scores of dependencies on each other among the three (CJK), which 
reached around 30% for Japan and Korea, while they recently declined for China, which seems to now 
export more finished goods directly to the EU and the US (for details see Chang Jae Lee, “Prospects 
for a China-Japan-Korea FTA: Light at the End of the Tunnel”, in Financing for Regional Economic 
Integration for Northeast Asia III, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), Seoul, 2011, 
pp. 33-43).  
Speaking on 28 October 2012 at the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) in Brussels, 
Kojiro Shiojiri, Japan’s Ambassador to the EU, cited an increase in intra-regional trade of even 700%.  
33 Also Dinh, op. cit., p. 1, sees the regional networks and economic actions as lying at the bottom of 
the “pyramid-shaped structure” of East Asian regionalism, in contrast to the EU model.  
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Germany, even to the level of elected government ministers and Vice-Chancellor. Of course, 
nowadays globalisation has considerably impacted the system of nation-states evolving since 
the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. It was only after Western colonisation that Asia became 
acquainted with the original concept of sovereignty in international law. Hence, the crucial 
importance of obtaining independence from foreign rule and the need to insist on its 
principles in order to liberate themselves from colonial powers (remember the liberation of 
Korea from Japanese rule after WWII as well as later Hong Kong and Macau from the 
Europeans) remains engrained in many Asian leaders’ minds.34  
Unlike the EU, which seldom speaks of its ‘nations’, but rather member states, ASEAN has 
‘nations’ even in its name, and often they are regarded as still ‘nation-building’. Only rare 
integrationists there would ever think of ASEAN members leap-frogging nationhood in 
order to directly merge into the still uncertain ASEAN Economic Community of 2015. 
Interestingly, not unlike the Western Europeans, who during the cold war more easily came 
together in view of their common opposition to the Warsaw Pact to their East, ASEAN 
members still try to find solidarity in dealing with territorial issues vis-à-vis China. They 
show such cohesion much less in negotiating trade deals with the EU, where they still expose 
their differences leaving them open to divide et impera tactics. Non-interference amongst these 
ten nations has been a basic principle of the ‘ASEAN-way35 and this will not go away soon. 
Of course, with growing de facto interdependence through globalisation and increasing 
international obligations through bilateral and multilateral agreements de jure, absolute 
national sovereignty simply does not exist anymore.36 Most Asians might not consider the 
progressive pooling of sovereignty rights as practised in the EU – notably in times of crises – 
moving from intergovernmental to supranational governance, as a model, and even less so 
today since nationalism is spreading again during the current crisis in Asia. Nevertheless, 
consumers37 strongly experience the benefits from economic exchange over national borders, 
not only when Chinese and Japanese tourists flood the shopping streets of Seoul with 
pockets full of cheap Korean Won.38 In their daily dealings they are increasingly aware of the 
jobs created from foreign investment and upgraded with imports of superior know-how.  
                                                     
34 See Zhongqi Pan, “Managing the conceptual gap on sovereignty in China-EU relations”, Asia-Europe 
Journal, September 2010. 
35 See “Sovereignty, Intervention and the ASEAN Way”, address given by Rodolfo C. Severino, then 
Secretary-General of ASEAN, on 3 July 2000 in Singapore. 
36  Sovereignty as the authority to decide to the exclusion of others in territorial terms is also 
increasingly undermined by multi-territorial activities, such as in aviation. The nationality of a plane 
might be irrelevant, but because emissions from planes have doubled since 1990 in the absence of an 
international agreement, an EU Directive of 2004 might soon impose extra-territorially pollution fees 
on incoming flights not only from the US, China, India and Russia, uniting them in a ‘coalition of the 
unwilling’, unless a multilateral agreement is found in the ICAO even sooner. 
37 In contrast to the previous Prime Minister of Japan, Noda, as pointed out by Kikuchi Yona, Research 
Fellow of JFIR, in his essay No. 71 of 19 October 2011, “Prime Minister Noda’s Negativism toward an 
‘East Asian Community’ Contradicts the National Interest of Japan”. However, former PM Hatoyama 
of the same DLP just two years ago displayed a very personal enthusiasm for regional integration 
resulting mainly from his readings of the works of Pan-Europeanist Coudenhove-Kalergie, which his 
grandfather had translated; see also Financial Times, 13 August 2009. Already in 2007, Japanese 
academics had published a detailed and annotated draft of an ‘East Asian Charter’ of 45 articles, see 
Tamio Nakamura, “Future East Asian Regionalism”, Research Series No. 28, Institute of Social 
Science, University of Tokyo, 2007, pp. 73-118. 
38 Five million tourists travel each year between Japan and Korea alone (The Economist, 8 September 
2012), and the number of Chinese tourists is growing the fastest now.  
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5. Monetary cooperation 
However, cooperation and integration amongst the three East Asian countries have already 
progressed farther than meets the eye of the European observer. Apart from the high 
percentage of intra-regional trade, they seem to have taken seriously at least one phrase of 
Robert Schuman’s Declaration of 9 May 1950, which regretfully does not enjoy high currency 
amongst Europeans today, i.e. “les réalisations concrètes créant d'abord une solidarité de fait”. 
Just to cite some recent examples: beyond the swap agreements among 13 Asian countries of 
the so-called Chiang Mai Initiative, demonstrating solidarity under the slogan ‘pooling risk 
expresses Asian fellow feeling and common Asian caution’,39  Japan with its enormous 
external assets is purchasing not only from its ‘Big Brother’ US treasury bonds, but now also 
from its continental neighbour Chinese bonds as part of its foreign exchange reserves. This is 
not done to follow ancient traditions of tributes to China, but purposely in order to reduce 
the risks in foreign exchange markets by “not putting all one’s eggs in one (Western) basket”. 
The Chinese, of course, openly welcome it in diplomatic terms as “positive to bilateral 
benefit”.40 
And, as if to prove that such deals between the second- and the third-largest national 
economies in the world are not just short-term affairs, according to the Japanese Finance 
Ministry, China sold a net 4.02 trillion Yen of short-term Japanese government bonds with a 
maturity of less than one year in 2011, up nearly ten-fold from the sum at which it sold the 
previous year. A foreign exchange analyst concluded that China seems to be selling short-
term bonds and turning to long-term Japanese bonds.41 
Whilst currency cooperation and union of the eurozone has increasingly come under heavy 
attack not only by the markets, in 2003 some Chinese authors suggested a sequence of 
“Monetary Integration Ahead of Trade Integration in East Asia”.42 
A roadmap towards an ACU43 has also been discussed by the Asian Development Bank for 
very concrete commercial reasons, because “in Asia, monetary integration could triple 
trade”.44 Not anticipating at the time the euro crisis, insiders in Japan and China rather 
                                                     
39 The pool of swaps was extended in 2012 to reach $240 billion.  
40 See Economic Daily, Beijing, 7 February 2012. 
41  See “China Offloads Short-term Japan Bonds by JPY 4 Trillion”, Beijing, 9 February 2012 
(http://news.hexun.com/2012-02-09/138009854.html). 
42  Jong-Wha Lee, Yung Chul Park and Kwanho Shin, “A Currency Union in East Asia”, ISER 
Discussion Paper 571, Institute for Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, March 2003. 
43 Asian Currency Unit, literally taking the pattern from the ECU as a predecessor of the euro. Already 
the ‘Fukuda doctrine’ of 1977 contained elements towards financial cooperation and integration in 
East Asia (see Aurelie Klein, “Japans Rolle in der ostasiatischen Integration”, Japan aktuell, Hamburg, 
2/2008, p. 55).  
In 1997, an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) was proposed in view of the Asian financial crisis, and 
efforts also continue to advance the research into financial institutionalisation; see details in Financing 
for Regional Economic Integration for Northeast Asia III, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy 
(KIEP), Seoul, 2011.  
44  See Richard Pomfret, “Sequencing Trade and Monetary Integration”, Working Paper 2001-14, 
School of Economics, University of Adelaide, 2004 
(http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpot/0502004.html). 
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foresaw an “Asian cooperation and the end of pax Americana”45 and at least an “end to the 
dollar era”.46 
6. From confrontation to cooperation with energy 
Still more fundamental in substance for our lives than the currents of money is the flow of 
water. This comes to a dangerous head when people say “the next war will be over water”, 
the very basic prerequisite for our survival. That is why China, Japan and Korea have come 
together in order to prevent such conflicts, since in March 2012 they signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding on water resource cooperation. It did not make headlines in Europe, but 
these three parties together hope thereby to help the world resolve splashing water 
problems.47 
As an island, a peninsula and a continental country – geographically close to one another but 
separate – the three countries are naturally less prone to find common understanding or to 
encounter conflicts over rivers and resources of water.48 Indeed, the issue of energy resources 
nowadays has grown to a much more important status amongst the three, notably in view of 
some of the gas and oil fields straddling their disputed borders under the common sea. East 
Asian demand for energy has risen more than five-fold since 1970.49 In addition, these 
countries suffer from a particularly high rate of import dependency – representing about 
80% of their energy consumption already before the Fukushima nuclear accident – 
paradoxically making energy the dark side of the explosive economic growth in the region. 
However, it might turn into the bright side of East Asian integration, because their trinity 
could catch ‘six birds with one stone’. 
The three countries could engage in concrete cooperation on energy to solve it all. In the 21st 
century energy security confronts the three with six common challenges: i) dependency on 
imports of oil, ii) security of sea-lanes for their energy supply, iii) contestations over 
maritime oil and gas fields near-by, iv) R&D in enhanced efficiency of energy use and in 
alternative sources, in particular development of renewables like wind and sun, v) security 
of nuclear energy and vi) environmental concerns of energy generation, transport, storage 
and use.50 
The single stone as a tool available to the North East Asian trinity to tackle these six common 
issues best and most successfully is cooperation and sharing between the three in 
partnership,51 notably at private level.  
                                                     
45 See Eisuke Sakakibara, “Asian Cooperation and the End of Pax Americana”, in J.J. Teunissen and M. 
Teunissen (eds), Financial Stability and Growth in Emerging Economies, FONDAD (Forum on Debt and 
Development), The Hague, 2003. 
46 See X. Zhou, “China suggests an end to the dollar era”, The Economist, 26 March 2009. 
 47 See news coverage at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2012-03-13/233124109254.shtml. 
48 In contrast to continental Europe with the oldest extant international organisation running a river, 
namely the Rhine Commission resulting from the Congress of Vienna of 1815. 
49 See Dent, “East Asian Regionalism”, op. cit. 
50 Dent (ibid., p. 251) listed the first five of these issues. 
51 See also Ken Koyama of the Institute of Energy Economics in Tokyo (IEEJ, Special Bulletin, 24 
August 2012, “Rising Geopolitical Tensions in Northeast Asia and Their Impact on Energy 
Problems”): “The cold fact is that Japan, China and South Korea are racing to secure resources in the 
global energy market. Their cooperation is possible and significant in many areas … Since the 2000s, 
the three countries have discussed and implemented possible, significant cooperation programs …” 
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Concerning the first challenge, of course, these three countries are competitors (if not even 
‘rivals’ in their own languages, see footnote 11) in buying carbon abroad, but cooperation 
and sharing information as well as an eventual agreement on reserves could significantly 
improve the stability of their oil and gas supply. The same applies to the second concern, 
namely security of the sea routes and pipelines used.  
Third, the East China Sea is of great economic interest to all three countries because of its 
proven or at least suspected hydrocarbon resources. That is why all three countries seem to 
have already recognised the advantages of cooperation instead of confrontation over oil and 
gas fields near or straddling their maritime borders, especially in the East China Sea. An 
agreement for that purpose between Japan and Korea was signed in 1974. Already then, 
similar proposals were made between China and Japan. However, only after a more general 
‘Peace and Friendship Treaty’ in 1978, and finally not until June 2008, they signed a formal 
agreement to cooperate in the East China Sea in order to turn it into a ‘Sea of Peace, 
Cooperation and Friendship’, despite the lack of bilaterally agreed maritime borders. 52 
Nevertheless, the ground for joint exploitation of maritime reserves of energy is now laid 
and trilateral cooperation should be feasible to overcome historical legacies between them. 
China is skilfully inviting international companies to join some of these projects, thereby 
multilateralising at least the intricate interests and potential risks involved in contentious 
areas beyond national borders with neighbouring countries. Anyway, some of the under-sea 
bubbles of gas and oil straddle the disputed border lines in such an intertwined way that 
tapping the resources from either side also would exhaust the hydrocarbon on the other side 
of the border. Hence, even if and when an international court would draw a border line, after 
much deliberation – and probably a loss of face on both sides – it would not necessarily solve 
all the issues of access and allocation to underlying energy resources, as we saw with earlier 
court cases in the Middle East.  
Certainly, from a legalistic European perspective, international law would provide the best 
direction towards a solution of the underlying territorial disputes.53 However, in Asia as 
shown above in the case of trade, de facto cooperation by private companies in exploiting the 
resources together – possibly with the involvement of third countries’ companies – might 
advance without much ado and loss of face about their public officials’ claims against each 
                                                     
52  For details see Reinhard Drifte, “Territorial Conflicts in the East China Sea - From Missed 
Opportunities to Negotiation Stalemate”, Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2009. Incidents keep 
flaring up over this border between China and Japan in the oil-rich and tuna-teeming sea near the 
disputed islets, in 2010 culminating in a Chinese captain of a fisher boat, who was later reported 
drunk, being detained by the Japanese authorities (see The Economist, 16 September 2010). In the 
summer of 2012, private ownership of some islands came under discussion in Japan as inappropriate, 
and the government decided to buy them. 
53  For instance, Japan has proposed to Korea to submit the case of Dokdo/Takeshima to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), but shies away from doing the same for Senkaku/Diaoyu with 
China. Each side when actually in physical control over an island seems to want to avoid a decision 
over its sovereignty according to law by the IJC or another body, thus blocking the common 
application of international rules. In Western eyes, the three applicable frameworks of the 1) UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 2) the concept of ‘exclusive economic zones’ (EEZ) and 
3) the principle of the ‘extended continental shelf’ (ECS) could lead to equitable solutions, but for 
Asians the risk of resulting loss of face and domestic repercussions render them less attractive. Hardly 
promising seems to be treating the cases merely according to their historic backgrounds, which often 
are of a highly subjective nature, particularly if based on more recent references; for details see 
University of Connecticut Prof. Alexis Dudden’s presentation on “Island Problems in Northeast Asia”, 
13th Asan Dosiak Series with Experts, Asan Institute of Policy Studies, Seoul, 2 November 2011. 
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other.54 Taiwanese proposals circulated around the end of March 2013 likewise seem to aim 
in this direction. Typically, the Chinese saw much less of a problem with one of the disputed 
islands as long as it was owned by a private (Japanese) individual. Their outcry grew only 
when the Japanese government bought (and thus ‘nationalised’) it. Privatising the issue and 
bringing it down from the high political level to less spectacular world-wide open tendering 
for commercial contracts of resource exploration and exploitation might, for the time being, 
serve as a solution to avoid further public spiralling of tensions. Not the institutional model 
of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, but pragmatic solutions 
with international consortia of private firms55 might be seen by Western lawyers as only a 
temporary ‘muddling through’. But as long as the political leaders do not have a long-term 
vision reaching beyond myopic domestic considerations (especially during e.g. election 
campaigns as took place in all three countries in 2012), such private projects in the meantime 
should avoid what might be worse and extract the best of the energy lying below the mud of 
the disputed sea-bed.  
Not surprisingly, even during the peak of the last China-Japan crisis when, for official face 
saving reasons, the head of China’s central bank cancelled his participation in the World 
Bank-IMF annual assembly because it was held in Tokyo, the two nations’ bilateral 
cooperation in financial business nevertheless continued unchanged. This practically 
important cooperation consists notably of the above-mentioned direct currency transactions 
                                                     
54 This dualism has to be understood in the Confucian context of the closer vertical links in East Asian 
societies where the Western concept of private (from Latin privare = to rob [from the public]; in Sino-
Japanese 私= I myself) is less abstract from the public domain (公), while a stronger group-orientation 
accepts more easily a difference in communication amongst insiders (内) from what is conveyed to 
outsiders (外); for details see Wolfgang Pape, Gyoseishido und das Anti-Monopol-Gesetz in Japan, Köln, 
1980, pp. 45-48; cf. as recent example the highly respected former president of Japan’s Science Council 
Kurokawa handing out the harshest criticism of his home country in his report on the Fukushima 
disaster only in English, i.e. to foreign readers. However, he was “much more measured” in its 
comprehensive Japanese version. He himself defended this dichotomy by saying it was reasonable to 
tailor the message to different audiences (“Global Insight”, by Mure Dickie, Tokyo, in Financial Times 
of 9 July 2012 and Wolfgang Pape with Kurakawa directly in conversation on 6 October 2012 in 
Kyoto). 
55 It would be difficult to directly apply the Public Procurement Code of the WTO, which China has 
not yet joined as a party. Nevertheless, an analogous application might help, as the low number of 
only four (out of 393 under WTO altogether) disputes citing this Code confirms its general 
effectiveness and high compliance rate (see Roy Santana and Lee Ann Jackson, “Identifying non-tariff 
barriers: Evolution of multilateral instruments and evidence from the disputes (1948-2011)”, World 
Trade Review, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2012, p. 471).  
However, cooperating countries and companies involved rather should consider the new concept of 
applying international law to state contracts with foreign companies on the basis of treaty standards 
and customary law (for details, see Ivar Alvik, Contracting with Sovereignty: State Contracts and 
International Arbitration, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011, p. 45). Such internationalisation would avoid 
conflicts of the different municipal laws (contrat sans loi) of these countries as well as problems of the 
‘verticality’ between private companies and sovereign states, but it would subject their contracts to the 
fundamental principles of natural law recognised by civilised states such as pacta sunt servanda. 
Furthermore, the UN Conventions (UN GA 2200A of 1966) relate the sovereignty over natural 
resources to ‘peoples’ and not to states. It cannot merely be regarded as an entitlement for the 
government to control (Ibid., p. 247). Thus, resource exploration and exploitation primarily should be 
conducted in the interest of the people, not only government. Private firms should be entitled to call at 
least for a panel if they consider that a state impaired or breached their investment rights, as available 
under the private-to-state dispute resolution of NAFTA, chapter 11 (see Isidro Morales, in “The 
Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective”, ISS Research Series No. 24, 
University of Tokyo, 2007, p. 74). 
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between Yen and Yuan as well as Japanese government purchases of Chinese government 
bonds. 
Admittedly, the three challenges on energy, discussed here, involve highly controversial 
issues between the three countries still burdened by history and suffering from growing 
nationalism, notably amongst their youngsters. 
Indeed, more promising for official trilateral cooperation is the field of the fourth challenge, 
namely the research and development of enhanced efficiency of energy use and of 
alternative sources. The Fukushima accident has considerably raised the urgency of such 
activities. Japan is regarded as a frontrunner in terms of efficiency in industrial use of energy, 
but less so in its use by private households. This provides incentives for exchange of 
information and collaboration with neighbouring countries for mutual benefit, because they 
are exposed to comparable climatic conditions.  
The longer experience and high technical standards of Japanese solar (especially 
photovoltaic) energy generation complements the growing Chinese mass production of it. 
Naturally, from increasing industrial competition and trade, issues of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties amongst manufacturers might arise, not unlike those recently between 
the EU and China over solar panels56 and the earlier one between the US and China, also 
over wind turbines.57 However, in the less legalistic world of the ‘Asian way’, they might 
find a path to avoid confrontation, as already indicated between Korea and China.58  
The fact that the collected energy of six hours of sunshine on the world’s deserts can cover 
human energy consumption for one entire year should inspire trilateral cooperation (plus 
Mongolia, perhaps) on concentrated solar power (CSP) projects under ‘Gobi-tec’59 similarly 
to Europeans cooperating with North-Africans on ‘Desertec’ in the scorched Sahara.  
Just like the Europeans eventually need to transport massive amounts of electricity over the 
Mediterranean, the Koreans propose an ‘Asia super-grid” linking six countries in their 
neighbourhood starting with an undersea cable from Busan to Fukuoka.60  
                                                     
56 Almost 60% of China’s solar exports, worth $35.8 billion, were shipped to the EU in 2011. China's 
solar firms at the end of July 2012 warned the EU of a trade war and called on their government to 
respond with all means to an anti-dumping complaint filed by European competitors.  
57 See “U.S. union challenges Chinese subsidies”, IHT, 10 September 2010. The US filed a legal case 
accusing China of violating WTO rules by subsidising exports of clean-energy equipment. The case 
led i.a. to the imposition in May 2012 of duties of about 31% on solar panel imports from China.  
58 At the “Korea-EU Solar Energy Workshop” on 8 June 2012 in Brussels, in response to the author’s 
question hinting at European makers’ initiative to file for anti-dumping/countervailing investigations 
at the time, Korean officials clearly indicated reluctance in their country to do likewise. At this stage 
they would rather negotiate and cooperate with China, in view of the latter’s “importance as a trade 
partner”.  
59  Such solar projects already were discussed with experts from China and Japan at an ASEF 
conference in September 2010 in Munich, but they now become feasible as presented 12-13 November 
2012 in Ulan-Bator i.a. by Dr. Masakazu Ito of CEA-INES in France with his study on very-large scale 
projects concluding that the Gobi desert has the highest-performance ratio of all desert areas. It can 
produce 43% of the world’s primary energy needs and nine times Asia’s electricity supply. Thus, 
renewable energy and energy grid integration (the ‘Asian super-grid’) could trigger closer energy and 
ultimately economic integration in Northeast Asia. 
60 See presentation by President of the Korea Energy Management Corporation, Jeung-Soo Huh, at the 
Japan Renewable Energy Foundation, Tokyo, 6 September 2012 
(http://jref.or.jp/en/action/event_20120727.html).  
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Fifth, security of nuclear energy after the Fukushima disaster sits at the top of the agenda in 
Japan. But in spite of the highly respected Kurokawa Report for Nippon’s Parliament 
notably pointing out to foreigners (as originally in English only!) the cultural factors of Japan 
that contributed to this ‘man-made’ disaster, China and Korea should also draw lessons from 
Japan’s experience, particularly in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or 
North Korea). They continue to build and even export nuclear plants. They should be 
benchmarked against new and stricter standards to be developed jointly if not globally.61  
This leads to the sixth common concern amongst these Asian neighbours, i.e. the 
environmental impact of energy generation, transport,62 storage and use. With the advance 
of industrialisation worldwide, the environment has become a truly common global good, 
and since especially the accidents in Chernobyl and Fukushima, we know only too well that 
we cannot stop dangerous radiation in clouds nor destructive ocean waves at national 
borders. There is a dire need for international or supranational cooperation on the 
environment, in particular for the fast-growing economies of China and Korea. Regionally 
rising temperatures and, with them, water levels of the oceans hit the maritime regions of 
East Asia more than most others. It is not only acid rain in Japan – claimed to come from 
industrial emissions in China – that adds to Japanese companies’ motivation to invest in 
cleaner coal-burning technologies on the continent. Joint research into standards for car 
emissions started with both their governments’ involvement in April 2013 in Beijing.63 
Japanese experience with densely populated urban agglomerations and Korea’s exemplary 
‘green growth’ initiatives can serve as excellent learning objects in the wider East Asian 
region.  
7. Conclusions 
In conclusion, the foreign reserves that have been accumulated in East Asia from trade with 
the rest of the world are huge. So too are the reservations that foreigners maintain in 
underrating the progress in cooperation and integration between China, Japan and Korea. 
But these sentiments are out of touch with current realities of intra-regional penetration in 
terms of trade and FDI when jointly produced parts of smart-phones cross their (disputed?) 
borders up to 100 times before hitting the world’s markets. They are out of date in view of 
the new common challenges facing the region, particularly with respect to energy security 
and the environment. Whilst roadmaps for cooperation in monetary matters towards an 
ACU recently have become discredited with too many potholes in view of the eurozone 
crisis and the need for prior banking and fiscal union, advances in the direction of 
cooperation in matters of energy and environment – notably with the involvement of 
multinationals – look more promising since they could also contribute to mediate in 
territorial disputes and to end the cold war in the East Asian region.  
                                                     
61 See “Global Insight” by Mure Dickie, Tokyo, Financial Times, 9 July 2012. 
62 As a measure of environmental load, parallel to ‘food miles’ (defined by Suzuki and Kinoshita, op. 
cit., p. 16, ‘energy miles’ could be quantified as tonnes of imports multiplied by transportation 
distance in kilometers. 
63 See report on NHK Radio World Service (in Japanese) on 9 April 2013. 
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